SUBJECT – The purpose of my research is to analyze the mechanisms that structure the cabinet governments and the cyclic coalitions in Amazonas state-level ultrapresidentialism. In other words I have on focus explaining the governor‟s logic of success, of his legislative coalition, and of his cabinet in the constitution of a superdominance web in electoral, parliamentary, and executive arenas. PERIOD – In this case study I analyze four administrations by three Amazonas‟ governors: Gilberto Mestrinho (1991-1994), Amazonino Mendes (1995-1998 e 1999-2002) e Eduardo Braga (2003-2006), and four Legislative Assembly legislatures. THEORY – As theoretical orientation I use the contribution of public choice theory and the institutional analysis. I begin by the premise that the governor plays attempting maximize his rent-utility function within a certain institutional structure (covered by the gubernatorial coattails logic) that incentive the cooperative and length strategic interaction among the main players (governors, state deputies, ministers, and citizen-voters) in multiple decision arenas. METHODOLOGY – Firstly I use the Experimental Studies Laboratory (LEEX) data archives to set up a map of the electoral, party, and parliamentary dynamics. Then I work with Legislative Assembly of Amazonas (ALEAM) data archives to check the legislative production organization (successful ordinary law projects), and the governor‟s party-parliamentary coalition strength. Finally I handle my own data archive on the ministerial circulation, and consequently I apply and calculate the coalescence rate to estimate the proportionality levels of ultrapresidential cabinet governments. CONCLUSION AND OUTCOMES – The governors mount up the monopoly of Executive power agenda and ones control with a lot of efficiency the Legislative agenda. Moreover they share out the patronage resources as selective incentives to their allies in the multiple arenas games. As consequence I conclude that the majority in the state-level ultrapresidentialism is done, on the one hand, by appearing of cyclic coalitions with large party support in legislative arena; and, on the other, by building cabinet governments with zigzag participation of legislators, partisans, and specialists.
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