The paper explains the philosophical foundations of the process of autonomization of the Hans Kelsen‟s Legal Science. The studies are focused on the debate about the epistemological foundation of the Human Sciences and how this influenced the Pure Theory of Law. The objectives are: a) investigate how the nineteenth-century debate about the epistemological foundation of the Human Sciences influenced the formulation of the kelsenian Legal Science; b) to study what are the legal and philosophical assumptions of the Kelsen‟s Pure Doctrine of Law c) to know what would have been the contributions of the Master of Vienna in this quest for reasons for give autonomy to Legal Science from Natural Sciences. Thus, the first Chapter discusses the Philosophical Positivism of August Comte and John Stuart Mill. The second Chapter introduces the movement of Neo-kantianism since Adolf Trendelenburg until the Marburg School. The third Chapter wants to know about the Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey and how He tried to make a "Critique of Historical Reason", as well as reasons for the Human Science comprehensive method. The fourth Chapter talks about the Neo-kantianism of the School of Baden, especially the Heinrich Rickert‟s Philosophy, explaining mainly the Principle of the worlds and The Principle for the concept-formation. The fifth Chapter deals with the formation of the tradition of legal positivism of the nineteenth century, especially the Germanic world. And finally, the sixth and last Chapter deals with the refutation by Kelsen to the Thesis of Gerber, Laband and Jellinek, and also, this finally chapter talks about the "the two methodological limits" of his Pure Doctrine of Law that, in the end, it can respond: yes, Kelsen did the Science of Law as Human Science, but not the same way as Rickert and other philosophers who discussed this topic since the nineteenth century. Kelsen was defending the idea of a Normative and Autonomous Legal Science that presupposes the postulate of axiological Relativism.
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