This research explores the normative concept of human rights by summarizing the
debate between the natural law theory of John Finnis and the liberal positivism of Joseph Raz,
two of the most relevant analytical theorists of contemporary jurisprudence. To follow this debate,
the article presents and criticizes three central arguments of Raz for the understanding of human rights: his thesis of unlimited authority, considered as exclusionary reason; his conception of
practical reason and the autonomy of subjective interests; and the emergent order of human rights
as limiting sovereignty. Then, the paper addresses Finnis' theory of natural law, also in three core
arguments for the elucidation of human rights concept: the thesis of basic human goods as the
foundation of natural rights; the universality and intrinsic value of human rights, according to the
dignity of the human person; and the relationship between legitimate authority and the common
good, based on the normativity of human rights. Finally, it concludes that Finnis is able to
respond to the difficulties identified in Raz.
Its methodology is hypothetical-deductive, based on bibliographical research, following a review of
the primary and secondary literature of these authors and formulating general hypotheses about
human rights.
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