This dissertation investigates the formation of practical reasoning in Aristotelian psychology, using the Nicomachean Ethics as its main basis. References to other works are also considered, as they serve as a necessary condition for developing an answer to that central problem. Chapter I presents the conditions necessary for a science about the human soul. This requires understanding the Aristotelian definition of science (1.1), the foundation on which all theoretical sciences are based (1.2), and the specific foundations of psychology (1.3). This exposition employs the explanation of the Principle of Contradiction found in Book IV of the Metaphysics, explores the polysemic notion of ousia, and examines how its principles, form and matter, relate to the study of the human soul. Chapter II delves into the study of the human soul as form, using the methodology presented in De Anima, investigating soul operations, and exploring the connection with virtues as set out in the Nicomachean Ethics. In Chapter III, it is discussed the practical syllogism as a combination of knowledge about ends and deliberation about means, through (3.1) the situation of the problem in the academic sphere with the contribution of Elizabeth Anscombe; (3.2) the critical evaluation of Jessica Moss's response to the problem of the mode of apprehension and the nature of the first practical principles and the defense of the noetic-experiential apprehension according to its scope; and (3.3) the comparison of readings regarding the object of phronesis and the presentation of the specification of the general ends as a proposed interpretation.
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